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POINT I
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE JURY'S VERDICT SINCE
IT CLEARLY PREPONDERATES IN FAVOR QF THE APPELLANT
Counsel for the respondent is correct in stating that the
evidence must be viewed in a light most f bvorable to the verdict
in determining whether a jury's verdict should be overturned,
However, counsel cites few, if any, facts that indicate that the
evidence when viewed in such light justifies affirmation of the
verdict.
The evidence to support the jury1^ verdict was so slight
and unconvincing that the verdict is plainly unreasonable and
unjust.

The only facts which could support the jury's verdict

are that the appellant was aware of the icy condition when she
traversed the area, and the respondent periodically salted or
sanded the parking lot and attempted to clear the frozen drains.
To the contrary, the facts supporting a verdict for the appellant
are that the bank held the lot open for customer use at all hours
during the day; there was a large unnatural accumulation of snow
and ice at the time of the occurrence?

the bank had actual

knowledge of the icy condition and understood

the danger to

invitees; the bank did not salt or sand the parking lot until
7:30 a.m. or 8:00 a.m. and never did so oh weekends unless there
was a major storm; the bank posted no warnings of the dangerous
condition; and, when the appellant was injured, the top level of
the parking terrace was covered with ice and had not been salted
or sanded.
847-852)

(T.528-532, 603, 634-635, 71lJ-714,' 826-827, 839-841,

Given

the

bank's

required

duty

of

care

to

business

invitees, it is clear that the bank failed to exercise due care
and thus breached its duty to the appellant*

Clearly the weight

of the evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to
the jury's verdict, preponderates in favor of the appellant and
the evidence is insufficient to support it. To hold otherwise is
plainly unreasonable and unjust,
POINT II
THE RESPONDENT BANK CANNOT AVAIL ITSELF OF
THE APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO AVOID THE DANGEROUS CONDITION
SINCE THE BANK'S NEGLIGENCE FAR OUTWEIGHED ANY
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE OF THE APPELLANT.
The duty required of the appellant, a business invitee,
was

to

exercise

protection.

reasonable

care

for

her

own

safety

and

Counsel's reliance upon Ellertson v. Dansie, 576

P.2d 867 (Utah 1978) and Moore v. Burton Lumber and Hardware
Company, 631 P.2d 865 (Utah 1981) in support of his argument that
because

the

plaintiff

did

not completely

avoid

the parking

terrace, she was negligent and therefore the jury's verdict was
justified is not well taken. . Neither the Ellertson nor Moore
cases strictly addressed the duty owed to a "business invitee" as
compared to a licensee.

Generally, a business invitee is one who

enters or remains on the premises for the benefit of the invitor,
or for mutual benefit and advantage of both invitor and invitee.
Calvert v. Garvey Elevators, Inc., 694 P.2d

433

(Kan. 1985)

Although the Ellertson case speaks in terms of an invitee in
commenting on a dangerous condition, that case is more accurately
2

categorized as one involving a licensee.

The Ellertson case

involved a plaintiff who, at his neighbors request, assisted in
untangling the neighbor's horse and as a result was injured.
Thus

the Ellertson

language

indicating

that the owner

of a

premises has no duty to warn or protect an invitee except to
observe

the

universal

distinguishable

standard

from the standard

toward a business invitee.

of

reasonable

care,

is

of dare ordinarily applied

The owner of ^ business premises owes

a duty to the invitee to use ordinary caire to keep the premises
reasonably safe and to warn invitees of any hidden dangers and
also must provide business invitees with safe ingress and egress
from

the

Piedalue

property.

v.

Clirjton

District No. 32, 692 P. 2d 20 (Mont. 1984)

Elementary

School

The evidence is clear

that the bank failed to exercise reasonable care in remedying the
dangerous

unnatural

condition

and

fa|iled

to

provide

the

appellant with a safe ingress and egress.
In Moore

v.

Burton

Lumber

and

Hardware

Company, the

evidence was apparently unclear as to whether the plaintiff was
an

invitee

or

a mere licensee since phe defendant disputed

plaintiff's claim that it had given him
radial arm saw at an
footnote 2.

agreed price.

permission to use a

^ee Moore at 867, and

The Court made a significant holding regarding the

defenses of assumption of risk and contr (Lbutory negligence when
it clarified that neither are a complete bar to recovery, but
should be treated in a comparative matter .| See Moore at 870-871.
See also Jacobsen v. Structo-Lite, 619 P.2d

306

(Utah 1980)

Instruction No. 25 phrased the appellantfb duty as a requirement
3

to avoid and left the impression that unless she completely
avoided

the

recovery.

hazard,

she

should

be

completely

barred

from

The instruction inaccurately described the appellant's

duty of care and constituted prejudicial error.
The language of Moore relied upon by defendant's counsel
is clearly

dicta

which cannot be controlling

addresses the limited issue of the trial Court's

since

harmless error

in failing to instruct the jury on a duty to warn.
case does not hold

it only

The Moore

that unless an adult avoids a dangerous

condition, he or she is to be completely barred from recovery.
In light of the overwhelming evidence of the bank's negligence,
the error in Instruction No. 25 cannot be considered harmless and
therefore the judgment should be reversed and the case remanded
for a new trial.
DATED this

, day of December, 1986.
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